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I. INTRODUCTION
1

By most measures, 12-year-old “M” was an observant Jewish boy.
2
Practicing in the Masorti tradition, M prayed in Hebrew, attended
3
synagogue, and participated in a Jewish Youth Group. It was not
surprising then, when M applied for admission to JFS (formerly the
Jews’ Free School). Founded in 1732, JFS is Europe’s largest Jewish
4
secondary school and receives funding from the British government.
As such, it is extremely popular among Jewish children and generally
5
considered to be an outstanding comprehensive school.
6
Nevertheless, M’s application was denied. Due to the popularity
of the school, JFS gave preference to applicants who were recognized
as Jewish by the Office of the Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew
7
Congregation of the Commonwealth (OCR). The OCR recognizes a
person as Jewish only if: 1) that person was descended in the matrilineal line from a woman whom the OCR would recognize as Jewish; or
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to thank Professor Gordon for her feedback on previous drafts of this Comment; the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law for their excellent editing and suggestions; and my mother, Martha Swartz, for her immeasurable patience,
amazing insight, and invaluable support.
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“Masorti” Judaism is referred to as “Conservative” Judaism in America. See Masorti: Jewish
Tradition and Halachah, MASORTI FOUND., http://www.masorti.org (last visited Oct. 9,
2010).
R (E) v. Governing Body of JFS, [2008] EWHC 1535/1536 (Admin), [34] (Eng.).
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2) the applicant’s mother had undertaken a qualifying course of Or8
thodox conversion.
JFS’ Headteacher informed M’s parents:
[B]ecause . . . [JFS] has not received evidence of [M]’s Jewish status it
would not be possible to consider [M] for a place unless and until all
those applicants whose Jewish status has been confirmed have been offered places. It follows from this that, as the School is likely to remain
heavily oversubscribed, [M]’s position on the offer list will almost certainly be very low and the likelihood of being able to offer a place is very
9
small.

M was dedicated to and engaged in the Masorti Jewish communi10
ty, and his parents were practicing Jews. M’s father was a member of
the Masorti New London Synagogue, and considered himself to be of
Jewish ethnic origin, to be of the Jewish faith, and to be a practicing
11
Jew. M’s mother was of Italian and Catholic origin, but she converted to Judaism under the auspices of a rabbi at an independent
12
Progressive synagogue. Many might consider M to be of Jewish her13
itage, but OCR did not. According to OCR and JFS, M’s mother’s
conversion was invalid. Consequently, OCR and JFS did not recog14
nize M as Jewish.
M and his family brought suit, alleging that JFS had discriminated
15
on the basis of race. In mid-December 2009, the Supreme Court of
16
the United Kingdom ruled in M’s favor. “[O]ne thing is clear about
the matrilineal test,” wrote Lord Nicholas Phillips, president of the
court, “it is a test of ethnic origin. By definition, discrimination that
17
is based upon that test is discrimination on racial grounds.”
18
As this case, officially known as R (E) v. Governing Body of JFS, illustrates, the line between religious categorization and racial discrimination is often blurred. When are seemingly permissible religious
distinctions actually prohibited racial discrimination? In many cases,
the answer may not be legally clear. In America, a country with a
unique history of both religiosity and racism, jurisprudence sur-
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Id.
Id. [60] (alterations in original).
Id. [34].
Id.
Id.
Id. [34]–[35].
Id. [35].
Id. [74]–[75].
R (E) v. Governing Body of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15 (appeal taken from Eng.).
Id. [45].
[2009] UKSC 15 (appeal taken from Eng.); [2008] EWHC 1535/1536.
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rounding racial and religious discrimination is well-developed.
Courts have recognized the fundamental importance of public edu20
cation, and disputes over race and religion in school admissions
have become increasingly contentious.
Public schools are generally prohibited from using race or religion in admissions policies, with a limited exception for benign racial
21
classifications. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion or national
22
origin in public schools, subjecting public schools to strict judicial
scrutiny whenever they use racial classifications in admissions poli23
cies. Benign racial discrimination in admissions policies, such as affirmative action programs, may be legally valid under certain circums24
tances.
Thus, while public schools may never make admissions
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For a discussion of racial discrimination, see, for example, Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From
Dred Scott to Barack Obama: The Ebb and Flow of Race Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER
L.J. 1, 1 (2009), noting the long, storied history of American race jurisprudence; Philip C.
Aka, Affirmative Action and the Black Experience in America, 36 HUM. RTS. 8 (2009), detailing
the legal history of race-based affirmative action in the United States; Derrick Darby, Educational Inequality and the Science of Diversity in Grutter: A Lesson for the Reparations Debate in
the Age of Obama, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 755, 756–57 (2009), describing racial discrimination
in the educational context. For a discussion of religious discrimination, see, for example,
Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or
Belief in the United States, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1187, 1188 (2005), assessing various laws
intended to address religious discrimination; John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 280 (2001), describing the
history and politics surrounding various interpretations of the Establishment Clause;
Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 673, 673–74 (2002), contending that the Supreme Court has interpreted
the Establishment Clause in such a way as to preserve political equality for and prevent
discrimination against religious minorities.
See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (noting that “education is . . . the most important function of state and local governments” and the “principal
instrument in awakening [a] child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment”).
Cf. Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2059,
2060 (1996) (suggesting that the use of benign religious classifications in public school
admissions decisions may also be a constitutional exception to federal anti-discrimination
statutes).
See Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 601, 606, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000d-4a(2) (2006).
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial classifications . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (“Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort
are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.”).
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720–22 (2007)
(explaining that the Supreme Court has recognized two compelling state interests that
may justify the use of racial classifications in the school context: remedying the effects of
past intentional discrimination and interest in diversity).
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decisions on the basis of racial animus, they enjoy a limited right to
25
engage in benign discrimination.
Title IV of the CRA also allows for the invalidation of a public
26
school admissions decision based on religion. More than that, however, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prevents any
public school from exercising religious preferences or creating reli27
gious restrictions.
Private schools, however, are not subject to the same antidiscrimination laws. As part of the First Amendment’s guarantee of
free exercise of religion and freedom of association, religious institutions remain free to discriminate on the basis of religion in admis28
Despite this exemption, courts have applied some antisions.
discrimination laws to private universities. In particular, courts have
prohibited private schools from engaging in race-based discrimina29
tion in admissions decisions.
This distinction between race and religion is complicated by the
blurring of religious and racial lines, especially by “ethnoreligious”
30
groups (i.e., groups identifying as both racial and religious groups).

25
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See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955) (“[R]acial discrimination
in public education is unconstitutional. . . . All provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle.”). But see Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. at 720–22.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a)(2) (2006).
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color or national
origin at any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance, but not prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of religion); see also Admissions, MARINERS CHRISTIAN SCH.,
http://www.marinerschristianschool.org/admissions/process.aspx (last visited Oct. 9,
2010) (explaining that Mariners Christian School may screen applicants on the basis of
religious preference and that “[a]t least one parent of each student must be a professing
Christian”);
Nondiscrimination
Policy,
ALMA
HEIGHTS
CHRISTIAN
SCHS.,
http://almaheights.org/hs/admissions/nondiscrimination-policy/ (last visited Sept. 28,
2010) (reserving the right to screen applicants on the basis of religious preference); Office of Gen. Counsel, Non-Discrimination with Respect to Students, CATHOLIC U. AM.,
http://counsel.cua.edu/fedlaw/Cr1964s.cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2010) (“An admissions
preference on the basis of religion at a private university is not considered a violation of
any federal law.”); School of Medicine Admissions, LOMA LINDA UNIV. SCH. OF MED.,
http://www.llu.edu/medicine/admissions.page (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) (giving admissions preference to members of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church).
See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976) (holding that a private school could not
legally discriminate on the basis of race in admissions decisions); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that the IRS may revoke a university’s tax exemption because the university engages in racial discrimination).
See, e.g., Daniel M. Hinkle, Peremptory Challenges Based on Religious Affiliation: Are They Constitutional?, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 139, 170–71 (2005) (describing how peremptory challenges based on religion may in fact, allow for racial discrimination).
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Should discrimination against or in favor of ethnoreligious groups be
treated as racial or religious discrimination?
31
32
Exhibiting both racial and religious characteristics, Jews are a
33
paradigmatic ethnoreligious group.
While Jews were commonly
34
considered a race in nineteenth century America, Jews are no long35
er assumed to be part of a particular racial group. Determining who
36
is a Jew remains a fraught question within the Jewish community,
making it even more difficult for courts to analyze discrimination
against individuals identifying as Jews. Despite the fact that Jews are
not generally categorized as a distinct race, however, U.S. courts have
allowed Jews to bring § 1981 and § 1982 civil rights actions, provisions
37
that protect against racial discrimination. If discrimination against
Jewish groups can constitute racial discrimination, may religious
schools make admissions decisions based on Jewish applicants’ religious practice as an acceptable exercise of private schools’ religious
exemption from anti-discrimination laws? Or does this discrimination constitute impermissible racial discrimination as in JFS?
In this Comment, I investigate the ways in which Jews’ ambiguous
status pose unique problems for courts charged with evaluating private schools’ compliance with anti-discrimination laws. In Part II, I
provide an overview of laws prohibiting racial discrimination in
31
32

33

34

35
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See, e.g., Nicholas Wade, Jews in Europe and Mideast Share Genes, Studies Show, N.Y. TIMES,
June 10, 2010, at A14.
See, e.g., CENT. CONFERENCE OF AM. RABBIS, THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF REFORM JUDAISM:
“THE COLUMBUS PLATFORM” (1937), available at http://ccarnet.org/Articles/
index.cfm?id=40&pge_id=1606 (“[W]e maintain that it is by its religion and for its religion that the Jewish People has lived. The non-Jew who accepts our faith is welcomed as
a full member of the Jewish community.”); Principles, AM. COUNCIL FOR JUDAISM,
http://www.acjna.org/acjna/about_principles.aspx (“We view Judaism as a universal religious faith, rather than an ethnic or nationalist identity.”).
See generally J. Alan Winter, The Transformation of Community Integration among American Jewry: Religion or Ethnoreligon? A National Replication, 33 REV. OF RELIGIOUS RES. 349, 349
(1992) (concluding that American Jews identify as an ethnoreligious group).
See, e.g., Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617–18 (1987) (noting that
“[i]t is evident . . . that Jews . . . were among the peoples . . . considered to be distinct races” during the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
Id. at 617 (“Jews today [in 1987] are not thought to be members of a separate race . . . .”).
See generally Michael Selzer, Who are the Jews? A Guide for the Perplexed Gentile—And Jew, 29
PHYLON 231 (1968) (examining who is a Jew); Solomon Zeitlin, Who is a Jew? A HalachicHistoric Study, 49 JEWISH Q. REV. 241 (1959) (detailing the history of how Jews determined
who was Jewish); Who is a Jew? The Great Debate, JEWISH CHRON. ONLINE (Sept. 30, 2009),
http://www.thejc.com/judaism/judaism-features/20463/who-a-jew-the-great-debate
(providing a roundtable discussion between prominent Jews as to who is a Jew).
See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 612–13 (1987) (holding that § 1981
protects members of groups that would have been considered races when the 1866 Civil
Rights Act was passed); Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617–18 (holding that Jews
may be considered a race for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982).
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school admissions. This includes a discussion of when race may be
taken into account in public school admissions, i.e., affirmative action
programs, and the applicability of race-based anti-discrimination laws
to private schools. Part III discusses the use of religion in admissions
decisions. In addition, I assess constitutional problems associated
with providing government aid to religious private schools and in restricting religious schools’ exercise of religious beliefs.
Part IV focuses on racial/religious discrimination against Jews and
how courts have analyzed anti-Semitism. Despite conflicting opinions
as to whether Judaism constitutes a race or a religion both in and out
of the Jewish community, courts treat anti-Semitism as racial discrimination. In Part V, I examine the implications of providing Jews with
race-based protections. After evaluating the competing constitutional
interests in dealing with anti-Semitism, I suggest a legal framework
for analyzing discrimination against Jews.
American courts have traditionally been reluctant to examine the
character of discrimination against Jews. By rejecting further inquiry,
however, courts provide Jews with unparalleled protection against any
form of discrimination. The American legal system differentiates between racial and religious discrimination; when dealing with groups
that exhibit both religious and racial characteristics, therefore, courts
should examine carefully a school’s rationale behind its admissions
choice. Although it can be difficult to distinguish religious discrimination from racial discrimination in cases of anti-Semitism, I argue
that—where feasible—courts must determine when discrimination is
based upon racial characteristics and when it is based exclusively on
tenets of religious belief. This inquiry will ensure standardized
treatment of victims of discrimination and safeguard religious
schools’ ability to express religious preferences in admissions decisions.
PART II. RACE-BASED SCHOOL ADMISSIONS DECISIONS
The validity of the use of race in educational admissions has
38
changed significantly in the past century. In both the public and

38

Compare Carr v. Corning, 182 F.2d 14, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (holding that statutes providing
for the separation of races in schools were constitutional) with Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 368–69 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (holding that race may be
considered in admissions decisions) and Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483,
495 (1954) (holding the segregation of children in public schools on the basis of race to
be unconstitutional).
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private school context, racial classifications in admissions policies are
now subject to exacting judicial review.
Recognizing the importance of education in breaking racial barriers, courts have both provided for the desegregation of public
39
schools and approved affirmative action programs in public institu40
tions. The Supreme Court’s understanding of the use of race in pri41
vate school admissions has also evolved. Though the state action
doctrine limits the applicability of constitutional provisions to private
42
actors, courts have held that private schools may not engage in hostile race-based admissions decisions.
A. Public Schools
Discrimination on the basis of race in public school admissions is
generally prohibited. Title VI of the CRA prohibits discrimination on
the basis of “race, color, or national origin” in federally assisted pro43
grams or activities, including public schools. Title IV of the same
Act permits the Attorney General to initiate a civil action against any
school board or public college that denies admission “by reason of
44
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
Yet courts did not recognize racial discrimination in schools as
unconstitutional until the twentieth century. The Supreme Court officially ended de jure segregation in public schools in Brown v. Board of
45
Education (Brown I) in 1954. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that
“it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. . . . [W]here
the state has undertaken to provide [education], it is a right which

39
40

41

42

43
44
45

See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (upholding constitutionality of the
University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 379
(affirming the constitutionality of affirmative action programs).
Compare Guillory v. Adm’rs of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674, 687 (E.D. La. 1962) (determining that a private university could discriminate on the basis of race in admissions
decisions because the university was not a state actor for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment) with Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172–73 (1976) (finding that federal
anti-discrimination laws prohibit private schools from making race-based admissions decisions).
See, e.g., Maimon Schwarzschild, On This Side of the Law and on That Side of the Law, 46 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 755, 756 (2009) (“The state action doctrine . . . holds that the institutions
of American government are bound by these constitutional provisions . . . but that private
persons and companies generally are not.”).
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006); see also Office of Gen. Counsel,
supra note 28.
42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (2006).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).

236

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:1

46

must be made available to all on equal terms.” Since then, schools
have grappled with the legal mandate to end government-sponsored
47
segregation.
To achieve racial equality in law, the Supreme Court employs the
highest standard of judicial review—strict scrutiny—when governmental actors subject individuals to unequal treatment based on
48
race. Governments must justify racial classifications by showing a
compelling state interest and demonstrating that the racial classifica49
tion has been narrowly tailored to meet that compelling interest.
The Court has held only two compelling interests to satisfy this standard: remedying past discrimination and achieving diversity in high50
er education. Thus, racial classifications rarely survive judicial scrutiny.
Courts have occasionally permitted state actors to engage in racebased decision-making in affirmative action programs. Because these
programs may serve one of the aforementioned compelling interests,
courts have determined that some race-conscious admissions programs are constitutional. Even so, educational affirmative action
programs must comply with certain criteria to pass constitutional
51
muster. These standards differ depending on whether the program
deals with pre-college or postsecondary education.
1. Affirmative Action in Higher Education
Struggling to develop admissions programs that effectively ensured racial diversity, public universities began to adopt affirmative
52
action programs in the 1970s. The Court, however, limited these efforts at integration, restricting and refining the use of race in admissions decisions in higher education in three foundational decisions:

46
47

48

49

50
51
52

Id. at 493.
Charles E. Dickinson, Note, Accepting Justice Kennedy’s Challenge: Reviving Race-Conscious
School Assignments in the Wake of Parents Involved, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1410, 1414 (2009) (describing school districts’ struggle to overcome segregation).
See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that all
racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152–153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that “discrete and insular minorities”
should receive heightened judicial scrutiny).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333–34 (2003) (explaining that racial classifications
are subject to strict scrutiny and thus are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored
to further compelling governmental interests).
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720–22 (2007).
See infra Section II.A.1–2.
Martha S. West, The Historical Roots of Affirmative Action, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 607, 619 (1988)
(discussing universities’ use of race-based admissions decisions in the 1970s).
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Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003).
a. Regents of University of California v. Bakke
In 1973 and 1974, Alan Bakke, a white male, was twice denied
admission to the Medical School of the University of California at Da53
vis. To increase the number of minority students, Davis had instituted a special admissions program that set aside sixteen out of one
54
hundred spots in every class for minority students. As a white male,
however, Bakke was not considered for the special admissions pro55
gram. Bakke sued, claiming that Davis’s program violated the Equal
56
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held
that “attainment of a diverse student body” was a “constitutionally
57
permissible goal for an institution of higher education.” Yet Davis’
quota system had gone too far: assigning a fixed number of places to
58
minority students did not further the legitimate goal of diversity. In
effect, the Court struck down the Davis program because it was not
narrowly tailored to meet the goal of greater student body diversity.
The six separate opinions in the case, however, meant that there was
no majority holding regarding whether strict scrutiny or a lesser stan59
dard of judicial review would apply to future admissions programs.
As a result, schools and lower courts were left with no clear framework for analyzing the constitutionality of affirmative action pro60
grams.
b. Grutter v. Bollinger
In 2003, the Court again addressed race-based admissions deci61
sions in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger. Grutter assessed the
constitutionality of the University of Michigan Law School’s admis-

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

61

Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 276–77 (1978).
Id. at 272–75.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 311–12
Id. at 315–16, 320.
Id.
Ellison S. Ward, Note, Toward Constitutional Minority Recruitment and Retention Programs: A
Narrowly Tailored Approach, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 609, 623–24 (2009) (describing confusion
regarding the constitutionality of affirmative action programs in the wake of Bakke).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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62

sions policy. The Law School evaluated each student based on a variety of factors including grades, LSAT scores, and an essay, as well as
“soft variables” including recommendations, the quality of the appli63
cant’s undergraduate institution, and racial and ethnic status.
When the Law School denied admission to Grutter, a white Michigan
resident, she claimed that the school had discriminated against her
64
on the basis of race.
Upholding the admissions policy, the court held explicitly that di65
versity was a compelling state interest. More than that, the Court
explained that the Law School’s race-conscious admission program
was narrowly tailored because it did not use a quota system, but rather considered race or ethnicity only as a “‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file,” part of a “highly individualized, holistic review” of each
66
applicant.
c. Gratz v. Bollinger
The Court applied that same analysis to the University of Michi67
gan’s undergraduate admissions program in Gratz. Michigan’s college admissions program used a points-based system. An applicant
received points based on high school grades, standardized test scores,
68
geography and alumni relationships. In addition, the applicant automatically received an additional twenty points (of the 100 points
needed to guarantee admission) if he or she was part of an underre69
presented racial or ethnic minority group. Two white Michigan residents who were denied admission despite being within the qualified
70
points range sued the University claiming racial discrimination.
While the Court reaffirmed that student body diversity was a compelling state interest, it held that the University’s points system was not
71
narrowly tailored enough. The University policy did not provide the
“individualized consideration” of each applicant upheld in Bakke and
72
Grutter. Instead, the automatic allotment of twenty points to minori-

62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311.
Id. at 315–16.
Id. at 316–17.
Id. at 325.
Id. at 334, 337.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003).
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id. at 251.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 271.
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ty applicants made “‘the factor of race . . . decisive’ for virtually every
73
minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant.”
Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz solidified diversity as a compelling interest
for institutions of higher education. The Court, however, continues
to refine its understanding of what kind of admissions program is
narrowly tailored enough to achieve this compelling interest. While
an individualized assessment of each applicant that takes race into
account may be acceptable, an inflexible point-based system that
awards applicants points because of race remains unconstitutional.
2. Affirmative Action in Elementary and Secondary Schools: Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1
Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz left open the question whether elementary and secondary school admissions policies may take race into ac74
count. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
75
No. 1, however, the Supreme Court addressed this issue directly.
Parents Involved challenged two school districts’ voluntary, raceconscious student assignment policies. The Seattle, WA school district classified children as white or nonwhite when allocating slots in
76
oversubscribed high schools. The Jefferson County, KY school district classified children as black or “other” in order to make elemen77
tary school assignments and to rule on transfer requests.
Both
school districts used race only to ensure that a school’s racial balance
78
mirrored that of the school district as a whole. Parents of students
denied admission to certain schools brought suit, claiming that the
school districts’ race-conscious school assignments violated the Four79
teenth Amendment.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. struck
80
down the school district assignment programs, limiting Grutter’s acceptance of student body diversity as a compelling interest to higher
81
education. While Justice Kennedy agreed with Roberts’ reading of
73
74

75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id. at 272 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)).
Ward, supra note 60, at 628 (suggesting that Gratz and Grutter created uncertainty regarding how to determine the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions programs in elementary and secondary schools).
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
Id. at 709–10.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 710–11.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 722–26. At least one author has suggested that five of the justices actually agreed
that diversity in primary and secondary education is a compelling state interest. See Ni-
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Grutter, he noted in his concurring opinion that “[d]iversity, depending on its meaning and definition, is a compelling educational goal a
82
school district may pursue.” In his dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by
Justices Ginsberg, Souter, and Stevens, argued that diversity should
83
be a compelling interest in primary and secondary public education.
Thus, a majority of the Court seemed to support the idea that student
body diversity is a compelling state interest in pre-college education.
The plurality held that Grutter’s analysis of diversity as a compelling
interest did not apply to K-12 schools but it did not decide that diversity could never be a compelling interest sufficient to justify racebased classification.
The majority agreed, however, that the Seattle and Jefferson
County programs were not narrowly tailored enough to achieve their
84
stated ends. The minimal impact of the districts’ racial classifications on school enrollment suggested that racial classifications may
85
not have been necessary. Roberts explained that narrow tailoring
“requires ‘serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
86
alternatives’” and that schools must employ a broader notion of di87
versity than white/nonwhite or black/“other” terms. Neither the
Seattle school district nor the Jefferson County school district had
88
considered alternatives or embraced a broader view of diversity.
While Gratz and Grutter provided some guidance as to when racebased admissions programs may be permissible in higher education,
Parents Involved only addressed an impermissible use of raceconscious admissions in elementary and secondary schools. It remains to be seen whether any race-based classifications will survive
strict scrutiny in elementary and secondary school admissions.
B. Race-Based Admissions Decisions in Private Schools
Private schools’ admissions policies are not subject to the same
constitutional constraints as public schools. Because racial discrimination is uniquely contrary to constitutional mandates, Congress and

82
83
84
85
86
87
88

cole Love, Note, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1:
The Application of Strict Scrutiny to Race-Conscious Student Assignment Policies in K-12 Public
Schools, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 115, 131 n.142 (2009).
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 842 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 733 (majority opinion).
Id. at 734.
Id. at 735 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003)).
Id. at 723.
Id. at 735.
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the courts have found other avenues to attack racially-discriminatory
89
admissions policies in private schools. Using civil rights laws and tax
statutes, courts have allowed private rights of action against racebased admissions decisions at private schools.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(c): Equal Rights Under the Law
42 U.S.C. § 1981 guarantees all Americans “full and equal benefit
90
of all laws and proceedings.” Originally enacted as § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the mak91
ing and enforcement of private contracts.
While on its face, § 1981 might not seem to apply to education, in
Runyon v. McCrary, the Supreme Court held that two black children
who were denied admission to two private elementary schools on ac92
count of school policies against racial integration had a cause of action under § 1981. The students had sought to enter into contractual
relationships with the schools for educational services, and they had
93
been prevented from doing so on account of their race.
Rejecting the school’s argument that § 1981 “d[id] not reach private acts of racial discrimination,” the Court stressed that parents
“have no constitutional right to provide their children with private
94
school education unfettered by reasonable government regulation.”
Moreover, the court held that the schools did not fall into the “private club or other (private) establishment” exemption in Title II of
95
the CRA. This exemption only applies to truly private clubs. The
Court explained that if a private organization comes within the ambit
96
of state action, Title II is no longer available. However, the Court
determined that the exemption “d[id] not . . . reach private schools”
because these schools were “private only in the sense that they [were]
managed by private persons and they [were] not direct recipients of
public funds. Their actual and potential constituency, however, [was]

89
90
91
92
93
94
95

96

See e.g. Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)–(c) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168–69 n.8 (1976) (discussing that § 1981 is “derived solely” from § 16 of the Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 144).
Runyon, 427 U.S. at 163–65.
Id. at 164, 172.
Id. at 173, 178.
Id. at 172–73 n.10. Because the private school at issue advertised in the “Yellow Pages”
and used mass mailings to attract students, the court found that the school’s actual and
potential constituency is “more public than private” and therefore ineligible for the “private club” exemption of Title II of the CRA. Id.
Id. at 173 n.10; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e).
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more public than private.” Consequently, § 1981 could be applied;
private schools could not deny admission to prospective students
based on race.
2. Tax Statutes
Six years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of
eliminating racial discrimination in private education. In Bob Jones
University v. United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) revoked
tax exempt status for Bob Jones University because of its racially dis98
criminatory policies. Claiming that this revocation violated the University’s rights under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment,
Bob Jones explained that its ban on interracial dating and admission
for interracially married students was religiously-motivated and based
on “a genuine belief that the Bible forbids interracial dating and
99
marriage.” In upholding the IRS policy, the Court explained that
the government has a “fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education—discrimination that prevailed,
with official approval, for the first 165 years of this Nation’s constitutional history. That . . . interest substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on [Bob Jones’] exercise of [its] re100
ligious beliefs.”
As Runyon and Bob Jones illustrate, the Supreme Court has eliminated purely race-based admissions decisions in both public and private education. The question remains, however: does government
have a “fundamental, overriding interest” in eradicating other forms
of discrimination in education?

97
98

99
100

Runyon, 427 U.S. at 172–73, n.10 (quoting McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1089 (4th
Cir. 1975)).
See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 148–49 (4th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 461 U.S.
574 (1983). Believing that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage, Bob Jones
refused to admit black students until 1971. Following Runyon, Bob Jones revised its policy. From May 1975 until this case in 1983, Bob Jones permitted unmarried blacks to
enroll, but applicants who engaged in an interracial marriage or were known to advocate
interracial marriage or dating were categorically denied admission. See Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 580–81 (1983). After Bob Jones University v. United States was
decided by the United States Supreme Court, Bob Jones changed its admissions policy to
admit members of all races. However, interracial dating continued to be forbidden until
2000. See Bob Jones University Ends Ban on Interracial Dating, CNN (Mar. 4, 2000),
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/03/04/bob.jones.
Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 602 n.28.
Id. at 604.
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III. DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION
Admissions decisions based on religion have been treated differently than admissions decisions based on race. Section 1981 and
1982 actions are only available for claims of discrimination based on a
101
plaintiff’s race.
Thus, race-based discrimination is disfavored in
both the private and public school context. Public schools are prohibited by the religion clauses from discrimination based on religion.
Private schools’ religious practice, however, remains constitutionally
102
protected.
Under the First Amendment’s guarantees of free exercise and freedom of association, religious organizations retain the
103
right to act on the basis of religious distinctions. As a result, the use
of religion in private school admissions decisions is not parallel to an
analysis of racially discriminatory admissions or to religious distinctions in public schools.
The use of religious preferences in private school admissions illustrates the different ways that race and religion are treated in constitutional law, especially distinctions between racial and religious categorizations and public and private actors. How can the government
(and, by extension, public schools) refrain from advancing or inhibiting religion while, at the same time, allowing private individuals (and,
by extension, private schools) to engage in discriminatory classifications? While the use of racial classifications in admissions decisions is
generally impermissible in both public and private schools, the legality of religion-based admissions policies is not as clear cut. A school’s
ability to give preference to members of certain faiths in its admissions policy depends upon the school’s source of funding and the religious nature of the institution. While private religious schools may
be able to exert religious preference in their admissions policies,

101

102

103

See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[Section] 1982, like § 1981, prohibits only discrimination based on race.”); Selden Apartments v. HUD, 785 F.2d 152, 159 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that prima facie elements of a
§ 1981 claim include plaintiff being a member of a racial minority); White v. Wash. Pub.
Power Supply Sys., 692 F.2d 1286, 1290 (9th Cir. 1982) (“It is well settled that section
1981 only redresses discrimination based on plaintiff’s race.”); see also Runyon, 427 U.S. at
167 (noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is “in no way addressed” to a private school’s ability to
“limit its student body to . . . adherents of a particular religious faith”).
See Jordan C. Budd, Cross Purposes: Remedying the Endorsement of Symbolic Religious Speech, 82
DENV. U. L. REV. 183, 237 n.314 (2004) (noting that, in contrast to race discrimination,
private religious practice is constitutionally protected).
U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1 (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
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public schools may not. Thus, the constitutionally required protection of religious beliefs in the private school context may constitute
an impermissible establishment of religion in the public school context.
A. Restrictions on the Use of Religion in Educational Decisions: Equal
Protection and the Establishment Clause
The CRA provides redress for religious discrimination in public
education. In particular, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 allows the Attorney
General to bring a civil action when an individual alleges that she has
been denied admission to a public school on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin and when that action will “materially
further the orderly achievement of desegregation in public educa105
tion.”
In addition—though not specifically related to the admissions
context—courts have enforced some level of equal protection for religious groups in schools. Public schools may not discriminate
106
against religious expression by their students. Moreover, the Equal
104

105

106

See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (omitting to prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion); see also Office of Gen. Counsel, Summary of Federal Laws,
Non-Discrimination
with
Respect
to
Students,
CATHOLIC
UNIV.
AM.,
http://counsel.cua.edu/fedlaw/Cr1964s.cfm (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) (“An admissions
preference on the basis of religion at a private university is not considered a violation of
any federal law.”).
42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (2006). “Desegregation” in this context refers to “the assignment
of students to public schools and within such schools without regard to their . . . religion”
as opposed to “the assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome racial
imbalance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b). But see Kenneth L. Marcus, Privileging and Protecting
Schoolhouse Religion, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 505, 507 n.18 (2008) (claiming that this provision
provides “little or no benefit, since desegregation is seldom the issue in religious discrimination cases”).
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (the First Amendment “requires the
state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it
does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as
to handicap religions than it is to favor them”). See generally Good News Club v. Milford
Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding that a school’s exclusion of a Christian children’s
club from meeting on school property because of religion was unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination); Rosenberg v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(holding unconstitutional a university’s denial of funding to a Christian student group
while providing funding to other student groups); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981) (holding that a public university that allowed political student-run groups to use
campus facilities had to provide the same access to a Christian student group); Child
Evangelism Fellowship of N.J. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514 (3d Cir. 2004) (affirming injunction against defendant school district that had engaged in unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination when it prevented an evangelical organization from distributing
flyers at a school event); Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 9 F.3d 1295 (7th Cir.
1993) (finding that school policy forbidding the distribution of all material with religious
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Access Act requires public schools to maintain a “limited open forum” to provide religious student clubs with equal access to meeting
107
spaces and school publications.

B. Defenses to the Use of Religious Preference in Educational Decisions: Free
Exercise and Freedom of Association
Unlike public schools, private schools frequently employ religious
preferences. The CRA does not mention private universities but
§ 2000c-6 tacitly allows for religious preference in admissions at pri108
vate religious universities. Thus, an applicant who is rejected from
a private university because of his or her religious affiliation would
not have standing to sue under the CRA. The free exercise of religion and the freedom to associate protected by the First Amendment
allow a private educational institution to ask an applicant to identify
her religion and to grant an admissions preference based on that
109
identification.
The Free Exercise Clause protects the autonomy of religious
110
groups from governmental interference.
As the Supreme Court
explained in Wisconsin v. Yoder, “there are areas of conduct protected
by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond

107

108
109

110

content violated the First Amendment); Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass. 2003) (granting high school bible club’s motion for a
preliminary injunction prohibiting school from imposing in-school suspensions on bible
club members and preventing club members from distributing religious literature to other students); Rivera v. East Otero Sch. Dist., 721 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Colo. 1989) (holding
that a school ban on material that proselytizes a particular religious or political belief was
unconstitutional discrimination).
The Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071–4074 (2000) (making it unlawful “for any public
secondary school which receives Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open
forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students
who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of religious . . . content of the speech at such meetings”); see also Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty.
Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of the Equal
Access Act.)
See, e.g., Office of Gen. Counsel, supra note 28.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (omitting religion as a protected class in anti-discrimination law).
Because § 2000d does not include “religion” as basis for protection against discrimination, educational institutions have interpreted § 2000d to authorize the exercise of religious preference in admissions decisions. See, e.g., Office of Gen. Counsel, supra note 28.
See Andrew A. Cheng, The Inherent Hostility of Secular Public Education toward Religion: Why
Parental Choice Best Serves the Core Values of the Religion Clauses, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 697, 763
n.269 (1997) (noting the importance of the Free Exercise Clause in preserving church
autonomy).
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the power of the State to control.” A law may violate the Free Exer112
cise Clause if it “unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”
Though the courts walk a “tight rope” in balancing the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, a ban on the use of religious preferences in admissions decisions would likely unduly burden
113
that institution’s exercise of religion. A religious school’s decision
to maintain a distinctive religious creed is at the core of that institution’s religious exercise. “Any governmental regulation of a private
religious school’s curriculum that infringes on . . . school’s expression [including admissions standards] is presumptively unconstitu114
tional.”
Consequently, religious schools retain the right to prefer
members of certain religious groups above other applicants.
The right to freedom of association reinforces the Free Exercise
115
clause. An individual’s freedom to worship requires the promise of
116
a commensurate freedom to engage in group worship.
Government actions that interfere with the internal organization or affairs of
a religious group unconstitutionally infringe upon members’ free117
dom to associate. Indeed, “[t]here can be no clearer example of an
intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a
regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not de118
sire.”
Moreover, government funding of a school that exercises religious
preferences in admissions does not automatically violate the Establishment Clause. In assessing the regulation of funding for private
religious schools, courts employ two tests. First, statutes governing
the funding of religious schools may be struck down under the Agostini test—a modification of the Establishment Clause test developed
119
in Lemon v. Kurtzman. Under this test, courts examine: 1) the ex-

111
112
113
114

115
116
117
118
119

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
Id.
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970).
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum:
Unconstitutional Conditions on “Equal Access” for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 653, 714 (1996).
See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (describing the relationship between
the freedom of association and the Free Exercise Clause).
Id. at 622.
Id.
Id. at 623.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). Under the Lemon Test, to be found
constitutional, “[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.” Id.
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court modified the test in
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tent to which a statute has a secular purpose; and 2) whether the sta120
Second, some
tute has the primary effect of advancing religion.
courts still employ the “pervasively sectarian” test. Under this test,
courts determine whether the school is “so ‘pervasively sectarian’ that
121
secular activities cannot be separated from sectarian ones.”
While statutes are occasionally struck down under the Agostini
122
test, schools are rarely found to be so sectarian as to compromise
123
government funding. Furthermore, in a series of cases against Columbia Union College (CUC), the Fourth Circuit held that an admission preference alone would not amount to a finding that a college
124
was pervasively sectarian and thus ineligible for public funding.
Consequently, a private religious school’s ability to employ religious
preference in admissions decisions is not likely to threaten federal
funding under the Establishment Clause.
IV. WHEN RACE AND RELIGION OVERLAP: ETHNORELIGIOUS GROUPS
As Parts II and III demonstrate, courts evaluate race-based and religion-based admissions preferences differently. How, then, are
courts to assess admissions discrimination when race and religion are
mixed in a single applicant or group of applicants? That is, how are

120

121

122
123

124

Agostini v. Felton, subsuming the “excessive entanglement” prong into an examination of
the statute’s effect. 521 U.S. 203, 222–23 (1997).
See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 844–45 (2000) (plurality opinion) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting that to determine a statute’s validity under the Establishment Clause,
courts examine whether a statute: 1) has a secular purpose and 2) has a primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion).
Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976). Note, however, that the viability
of the pervasively sectarian test is debatable. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 826–29 (Thomas, J.,
plurality) (suggesting that the pervasively sectarian test should be abandoned); James A.
Davids, Pounding a Final Stake in the Heart of the Invidiously Discriminatory “Pervasively Sectarian” Test, 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 59, 93–104 (2008) (describing circuit courts’ confusion
regarding the vitality of the pervasively sectarian test post-Mitchell).
See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
See, e.g., Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151, 163 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he Supreme Court has set the bar to finding an institution of higher learning pervasively sectarian quite high.”); see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 826–29 (2000) (Thomas, J., plurality) (suggesting that the “pervasively sectarian” standard should be dismissed entirely.)
Columbia Union Coll., 159 F.3d at 163 (“[T]he college must in fact possess a great many of
the following characteristics: mandatory student worship services; an express preference
in hiring and admissions for members of the affiliated church for the purpose of deepening the religious experience or furthering religious indoctrination; academic courses implemented with the primary goal of religious indoctrination; and church dominance over
college affairs as illustrated by its control over the board of trustees and financial expenditures.”).
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courts to evaluate discrimination targeted at a member of an ethnore125
ligious group?
Members of ethnoreligious groups exhibit both religious and eth126
nic concerns.
Many groups have been labeled as “ethnoreligious”
including Tibetan Buddhists, Uighur Muslims in China, Turkish Muslims in Europe, Greek Orthodox, and Italian Catholics in the United
127
States. This Comment, however, focuses on Jews. Jews are a prime
example of an ethnoreligious group: while Jews may embrace a distinct religious identity, Jews may also be grouped together in national
128
or ethnic terms. As sociologist J. Alan Winter wrote, “while primarily differentiated by their religious beliefs and practices, Jews are diffe129
rentiated as well . . . by a sense of peoplehood.”
A. A Historical Understanding of Judaism: Race or Religion?
Determining whether Judaism is a religion or a race is no easy
task. Some scholars maintain that Judaism fits into neither of those
130
categories. While some argue that Judaism denotes a religion with
normative beliefs and practices, others claim that Jews who practice
131
However, an
Judaism are members of the ethnic group, the Jews.
individual of Jewish heritage who declares herself to be an atheist
132
may still be considered a Jew by other Jews.
125

126

127
128
129
130

131

132

See Peter G. Danchin, U.S. Unilateralism and the International Protection of Religious Freedom:
The Multilateral Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 33, 45 n.18 (2002)
(“[E]thnoreligious groups are comprised of members bound together by loyalty to common ethnic origins, prominently including religious identity, but interwoven with language, physical (or ‘racial’) characteristics etc.”); see also Hinkle, supra note 30, at 169–73
(explaining how religion and race are often confused in jury selection).
J. Alan Winter, The Transformation of Community Integration among American Jewry: Religion
or Ethnoreligion? A National Replication, 33 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 349, 350 (1992) (defining
ethnoreligious groups).
Danchin, supra note 125, at 44 n.18 (2002) (listing different ethnoreligious groups.)
Winter, supra note 126, at 350 (1992) (describing different facets of Jewish identity).
Id. at 351.
For example, Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz writes that Judaism is neither a religion, a race or nation, or an ethnic group. Instead, he claims that Jews are “essentially and principally” a
family. Stensaltz claims that someone who removes himself from the Jewish “family” and
converts to another religion is still a Jew because of his genetic ties. Under this framework, Judaism becomes an immutable characteristic and points more towards the idea of
Judaism as race. See ADIN STEINSALTZ, WE JEWS: WHO ARE WE AND WHAT SHOULD WE DO?
42–55 (Yehuda Hanegbi & Rebecca Toueg trans., 2005).
See Jacob Neusner, Jew and Judaist, Ethnic and Religious: How They Mix in America, in
RELIGION AND THE CREATION OF RACE AND ETHNICITY 85, 85 (Craig R. Prentiss ed., 2003);
see also ASHLEY MONTAGU, STATEMENT ON RACE 52–57 (3d ed. 1972) (arguing that Jews
are not a race but rather a religious and cultural group).
STEINSALTZ, supra note 130, at 53–55 (writing “a person cannot leave or be ejected from
the Jewish family”); Neusner, supra note 131, at 88.
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Genetic characteristics are often traced to Jewish ancestry. This
suggests that Judaism is an immutable status similar to race. By converting to Judaism, however, a gentile—a person without ethnic or
134
racial Jewish heritage—becomes a Jew.
This points towards a conception of Judaism as a changeable identity that can be adopted at
will, a religion. Thus, Judaism straddles race and religion, depending
on where the emphasis lies.
Notably, while Americans at one time embraced a notion of Ju135
daism as race, that understanding gradually faded. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a conception of Judaism as a
“race” allowed Jews to express an attachment to “Jewishness” as assimilation to American culture began to tear down cultural boundaries
136
between minority groups.
As Americans became concerned with
the rise of immigrant labor taking away industrial jobs from nativeborn whites at the beginning of the twentieth century, however, many
Jews struggled with the tension between accepting the benefits of
identifying more strongly with the “Caucasian family” and their desire
137
to preserve a more distinct racial identity.
World War II further extinguished the notion of Judaism as race.
As part of their justification for the Holocaust, Nazis labeled Jews an
138
inferior race. Promoting eugenics and “race hygiene,” Nazis “med139
icalized anti-Semitism to lend legitimacy to the genocide.” As one
result of this Nazi conception of Judaism as a race, Jewish writers of
the 1940s and 50s began to move away from a racial definition of Jews
and towards an understanding of Judaism based on shared religion
133

134

135

136
137
138

139

Jonathan Weems, A Proposal for a Federal Genetic Privacy Act, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 109, 116
(2003) (noting the genetic link between Tay-Sachs disease and Ashkenazi Jews); Wade,
supra note 31 (reciting recent genetic studies finding Jews to be genetically related); see
also Kenneth L. Marcus, Jurisprudence of the New Anti-Semitism, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 371,
392 n.134 (2009) (describing genetic patterns common among Jews).
STEINSALTZ, supra note 130, at 53–55. Jewish denominations are partially differentiated
based on their respective conversion processes. The legitimacy of M’s mother’s Progressive Jewish conversion in the eyes of the Orthodox JFS was the central issue in JFS. See R
(E) v. Governing Body of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, [17], [22] (appeal taken from Eng.).
See generally Eric L. Goldstein, Contesting the Categories: Jews and Government Racial Classification in the United States, 19 JEWISH HIST. 79 (2005) (discussing the history of American
conceptions of Judaism as a “race”).
Id. at 81.
Id. at 83–84.
See Nazi Racism, U. S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, http://www.ushmm.org/outreach/
en/article.php?ModuleId=10007679 (last visited Oct. 9, 2010); see also Joseph Avanzato,
Section 1982 and Discrimination against Jews: Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 37 AM.
U. L. REV. 225, 228 n.13 (1987) (substantiating the claim that Nazi persecution of Jews
was racially motivated). See generally ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF (1924).
NAOMI BAUMSLAG, MURDEROUS MEDICINE: NAZI DOCTORS, HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION,
AND TYPHUS 37 (2005).
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140

and culture.
For some, the idea of a Jewish race condones Nazi
propaganda.
Americans’ rejection of the idea of Judaism as a race was explored
141
publicly in Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb in 1987. Shaare Tefila
addressed the question of whether painting anti-Semitic slogans,
142
phrases, and symbols on a synagogue violated 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
The lawsuit highlighted Jews’ reluctance to accept a racialized identi143
ty. The National Jewish Community Relations Council asserted that
“there ought not to be the suggestion that the Jewish community in
144
any way gives sanction to the notion that Jews constitute a race.”
The American Jewish Committee and Anti-Defamation League of
B’nai B’rith eventually submitted amicus curiae briefs in favor of providing Jews with protection from “racial discrimination,” but neither
of these organizations “believed that the Jews actually constituted a
‘race’ . . . . Ultimately, they were willing to accept the terminology of
‘race’ because it was the only language available in American law that
145
could bring Jews under the umbrella of civil rights protection.”

140

141
142

143

144
145

Susan A. Glenn, In the Blood? Consent, Descent, and the Ironies of Jewish Identity, 8 JEWISH
SOC. STUD. 145, 146 (2002). Glenn cites several literary examples of ways in which the
idea of a Jewish racial identity declined in the wake of World War II. For example, in the
Academy Award-winning film, Gentleman’s Agreement (1947), a Jewish physicist character
“challenges the idea that being a Jew is a matter of racial descent.” Id. The character
states, “‘I have no religion, so I am not Jewish by religion. Further, I am a scientist, so I
must rely on science which tells me I am not Jewish by race, since there’s no such thing as
a distinct Jewish race.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, Glenn explains
that editors of the 1955 volume Who’s Who in World Jewry: A Biographical Dictionary of Outstanding Jews determined that “the principle [of] ‘Jewish birth’ would not determine the
selection process [for the volume]. Instead, the list [of individuals included] . . . would
be based on the modern concept of ‘self-identification as a Jew’ as evidenced by ‘participation in some phase of Jewish life.’” Id. at 147.
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987).
Id. at 616 (“Section 1982 guarantees all citizens of the United States, ‘the same
right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.’ The section also forbids both official and private racially
discriminatory interference with property rights . . . .” (alteration in original) (citing
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968))).
See, e.g., Naomi W. Cohen, Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb: A New Departure in American Jewish Defense? 3 JEWISH HIST. 95, 100–02 (1988) (explaining various national Jewish
organizations’ reluctance to agree to categorize Judaism as a race).
Id. at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Goldstein, supra note 134, at 99.
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B. A Legal Understanding of Judaism: Jews and Race
Even the identification of Jews is difficult. “Who is a Jew?” wrote
Justice James Munby in JFS; “as will . . . become apparent, that is not a
146
matter on which all . . . agree.”
In the United States, numerous cases suggested that Jews should
147
be legally treated as a race. A pair of Supreme Court cases in 1987
solidified the idea of Jews as a race as binding law.
First, in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the Court held that a
Caucasian Arab could sustain a claim of racial discrimination under
148
42 U.S.C. § 1981. In Saint Francis, an Iraqi-born United States citi149
zen was hired as a professor.
The professor alleged that he had
been denied tenure because of his “Arabian” race and sued under
150
The college argued that § 1981 did not encompass claims
§ 1981.
151
of discrimination by one Caucasian against another.
Noting that
152
§ 1981 had its source in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Court concluded that at the time of its passage, Arabs were not considered to
153
be the same race as Englishmen, Germans, and other Caucasians.
Thus, the Court wrote, “we have little trouble in concluding that
Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes
of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics” regardless of “whether or not [they] would be classified as racial in terms of modern
154
scientific theory.” Although Saint Francis did not explicitly mention
whether § 1981 would apply to Jews, by interpreting § 1981 to protect
all groups of people considered to be distinct racial groups at the
146
147

148
149
150

151
152
153
154

R (E) v. Governing Body of JFS, [2008] EWHC 1535/1536 (Admin), [6] (Eng.).
See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 111 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring)
(describing treatment of the “Jewish race” in Germany); Banker v. Time Chem., Inc., 579
F. Supp 1183, 1186 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (arguing that Nazi anti-Semitism was motivated by racism); Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 567 & n.25 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (noting that
Jews are the target of “racial prejudice”); Marlowe v. Fisher Body, No. 35206, 1972 WL
197, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 26, 1972) (arguing that prejudice against Jews has become racial); see also LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 781 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Because Jewish culture, ancestry, and ethnic identity are intricately bounds up with Judaic
religious beliefs, racial and religious discrimination against Jews cannot be . . . easily distinguished . . . .”).
Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
Id. at 606.
Id. at 606, 609 (“Although § 1981 does not itself use the word ‘race,’ the court has construed the section to forbid all ‘racial’ discrimination in the making of private as well as
public contracts.” (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168, 174–75 (1976))).
Id. at 609–10.
Id. 610–12.
Id. at 612.
Id. at 613.
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passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the case laid the groundwork
for Jews to claim discrimination under § 1981.
The Court officially asserted § 1981’s applicability to Jews in Shaare
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, finding that the term “race” within the
meaning of the 1866 Act was not limited by contemporary usage of
155
In Shaare Tefila, petitioners claimed that they had been
the term.
deprived of the right to hold property in violation of § 1982 because
the defendants’ desecration of their synagogue was motivated by “ra156
cial prejudice.”
Defendants claimed that because Jews were not
members of a “racially distinct group,” petitioners could not state a
157
claim for racial discrimination under § 1982. Thus the question before the Court boiled down to whether Jews could be considered a
race for purposes of § 1982 protections: were Jews the “kind of group
that Congress intended to protect” when it passed the Civil Rights Act
158
of 1866. Adopting Saint Francis’ interpretation of congressional intent, the Court determined that Jews were among the peoples consi159
dered to be a distinct race within the protection of the 1866 Act. As
a result, the Jewish petitioners could maintain a § 1982 action.
Saint Francis and Shaare Tefila jointly established that Jews are le160
gally considered to be a race for civil rights actions. In the wake of
the two decisions, protection of Jews as a “race” was extended to allow
Jews to maintain § 1981 actions and cases under the Thirteenth
161
Amendment.
In addition, Jews may be able to receive protection
under Title VI against racial discrimination in federally assisted pro162
grams or activities.
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

162

Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617 (1987).
Id. at 616.
Brief for Respondent at 5, Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (No.
85-2156).
Id. at 617.
Id. at 617–18.
See Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1730
n.110 (2000) (noting that Shaare Tefila applied Saint Francis’ reasoning).
See U.S. v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 176–77 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Jews . . . are today generally not
considered a distinct race. . . . [However], the Supreme Court’s case law firmly and clearly
rules that Jews count as a ‘race’ under certain civil rights statutes enacted pursuant to
Congress’s power under the Thirteenth Amendment. . . . [T]hese cases not only extend
the protections of Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes, now codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1982, to Jews understood as a ‘race,’ they also implicitly rule that the Thirteenth Amendment . . . protects Jews as a race.”) (citations omitted).
See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(d) (2000). Jews’ ability to receive
Title VI protections remains in flux. In 2004, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) issued a
formal “Dear Colleague” letter informing recipient institutions that it would exercise its
Title VI jurisdiction to defend Jews. The OCR also issued a guidance letter explaining
that “‘Jewish’ may be interpreted as an ethnic [or] . . . racial category.” Kenneth L. Marcus, supra note 132, at 387–88; see Memorandum from Kenneth L. Marcus, Deputy Assis-
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Since Saint Francis and Shaare Tefila, lower courts have been reluctant to differentiate between religious and racial discrimination
against Jews. This has resulted in at least two rulings that extend the
163
1866 Act to purely religious discrimination against Jews. In LeBlancSternberg v. Fletcher, a Hasidic Rabbi sued those responsible for incorporation of the village of Airmont, New York, alleging that Airmont
had been incorporated in order to prevent the development of Or164
thodox Jewish residential neighborhoods.
The rabbi claimed that
the defendants had violated the Hasidim’s right to use and enjoy
165
property under § 1982.
Defendants, however, asserted that their
motivation was purely religious, being “directed toward the plaintiffs’
166
While the
lifestyle as dictated by the tenets of plaintiffs’ religion.”
federal district judge acknowledged that the defendants’ actions were
based on the plaintiff’s religion, he said that this “ma[de] . . . no difference . . . . Because Jewish culture, ancestry, and ethnic identity are
intricately bound up with Judaic religious beliefs, racial and religious
discrimination against Jews cannot be as easily distinguished as de167
fendants would have it . . . . We need not inquire any further.” Rejecting an examination of the nature of the anti-Semitism, the judge
held that the Jewish plaintiffs had stated claims for racial discrimina168
tion under §§ 1981 and 1982.
A second judge also overlooked claimed distinctions between religious and racial discrimination in Singer v. Denver School District No.
169
1. In that case, a Hispanic public school teacher who converted to
Orthodox Judaism claimed that he had experienced discrimination

163
164
165
166
167
168
169

tant Sec’y for Enforcement, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Sept. 13, 2004),
available
at
http://www.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/religious-rights2004.html; Letter from Kenneth L. Marcus, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Enforcement, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Sidney
Groeneman, Senior Research Assoc., Inst. for Jewish & Cmty. Research 1–2 (Oct. 22,
2004), available at http://www.eusccr.com/letterforcampus.pdf. In 2006, however, Honorable Stephanie Monroe, Assistant Secretary of Education for Civil Rights, stated that
the OCR will not investigate allegations of anti-Semitic harassment unless the allegations
also include other forms of discrimination over which OCR has subject matter jurisdiction. See Letter from Stephanie Monroe, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ.,
to Kenneth L. Marcus, Staff Dir., U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights 1 (Dec. 4, 2006), available
at http://www.eusccr.com/lettermonroe.pdf.
See Singer v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1, 959 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Colo. 1997); LeBlancSternberg v. Fletcher 781 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
LeBlanc-Sternberg, 781 F.Supp at 264.
Id. at 267.
Id.
Id. at 267–68.
Id.
Singer v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1, 959 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Colo. 1997).
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170

on account of his race and his religion. Because Singer was a convert without any Jewish ancestry or heritage, it would seem that any
discrimination faced by Singer would not be racial anti-Semitism, but
rather discrimination based on his Jewish religious practices—
171
religious anti-Semitism.
Singer himself described the discrimina172
tion as religious, accusing his employer of “religious harassment.”
Surprisingly, however, the court rejected the argument that Singer’s
claims were purely religious: “[s]ince Singer is claiming he was discriminated against as a Jew, a distinct racial group for the purposes of
§ 1981, Defendants are not entitled to judgment on the basis that he
173
is claiming religious discrimination.”
Singer suggests that even if
Jews are subject to purely religious classification, they will still have
access to racial protections.
LeBlanc-Sternberg and Singer demonstrate that courts will be reluctant to differentiate between religious and racial discrimination, at
least in the case of discrimination against Jews. In a sense, this provides Jews with a greater level of protection than other non-racial, re174
ligious minority groups. For example, if a Mormon—a member of
a non-racial, religious minority group—was fired as a result of his
Mormon religious observance, he could not claim he had been discriminated against as a result of his race in violation of § 1981. In
contrast, a Jew who was fired solely as a result of his Jewish religious
practice could allege racial discrimination under § 1981. Thus, while
claims of religious discrimination are not actionable under §§ 1981
and 1982, Jews—because of their unique racial and religious status—
may use these statutes to mount claims of religious discrimination by
claiming that they were discriminated against on the basis of their status as Jews.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR GREATER JUDICIAL INQUIRY INTO ANTI-SEMITISM
Anti-Semitism presents courts with two conflicting interests: an
interest in preserving the First Amendment’s guarantee of religious

170
171

172
173
174

Id. at 1326–28.
William Kaplowitz, We Need Inquire Further: Normative Stereotypes, Hasidic Jews, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 537, 555 (2007) (analyzing the discrimination
against Singer).
Singer, 959 F. Supp at 1328.
Id. at 1331.
See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976) (explaining that § 1981 does not
apply to religious discrimination); Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d. 1163, 1167 n.3 (9th Cir.
2007) (“It is well established, however, that § 1981 does not apply to claims of religious
discrimination.”).
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schools’ right to religious preference and an interest in preserving
the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections against impermissible racial discrimination. To better balance these conflicting interests,
courts should be more willing to examine the nature of the discrimination. Discrimination related to immutable characteristics of ancestry should remain subject to traditional race-based protections while
discrimination relating to religious beliefs and practice should receive only those protections available to religious discrimination.
Greater judicial inquiry into the nature of the anti-Semitism at issue would be valuable for two reasons. First, by distinguishing between racial and religious anti-Semitism, courts could ensure that all
victims of religious discrimination are treated similarly and that all
victims of racial discrimination are treated similarly. Otherwise, Jews
are essentially afforded a unique legal status that undermines basic
fairness. Second, by examining the nature of the discrimination
against Jews, courts can preserve religious schools’ constitutionally
protected right to express religious preferences. While a closer examination of anti-Semitism might require increased expenditure of
judicial resources, because of the small number of cases in this area
and judicial flexibility in choosing how to protect victims of discrimination, the benefit to maintaining clear boundaries between religious
and racial animus outweighs concerns regarding judicial economy.
A. Ensuring Similar Treatment
In the interests of consistency and fairness, courts should examine
anti-Jewish discrimination to ensure that all victims of religious and
racial discrimination are treated similarly. By allowing Jews to bring
race-based claims and refusing to inquire into the nature of the discrimination (racial or religious) against Jews, courts effectively provide Jews with a unique level of protection from discrimination. Case
law suggests that anyone identifying as Jewish—independent of their
ancestry or manner of conversion—may invoke race-based protec175
tions against discrimination.
Because laws governing the use of
176
race and the use of religion in admissions decisions differ, this
access to race-based protections effectively ensures that any discrimination against Jews in admissions decisions is race-based and impermissible.
By providing Jews with race-based protections, courts give Jews
greater protection than other victims of religious discrimination.
175
176

See, e.g., Singer, 959 F. Supp. at 1331.
See infra Parts II-III.
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This kind of disparate treatment belies the fairness that forms the basis of the American legal system because courts have differentiated
between religious and racial discrimination when dealing with other
177
groups.
This kind of disparate treatment could also trigger increased anti-Semitism based on resentment of Jews’ unique receipt of
178
race-based protections.
One could argue that courts have a greater interest in protecting
Jews than some other minority groups because of America’s legacy of
179
anti-Semitism.
Perhaps Jews, like African-Americans, deserve increased judicial protections as a result of “the tragic and indelible fact
that discrimination . . . has pervaded our Nation’s history and con180
tinues to scar our society.”
The potential for backlash argues against an automatic provision
of racial antidiscrimination protections for Jews, however. Allowing
Jewish victims of religious discrimination to assert race-based discrimination claims could trigger “backlash against ‘special rights’ and
‘special treatment’” afforded to Jewish victims of religious discrimina181
tion, leading to a fortification of anti-Semitic animus. As one scholar noted in his evaluation of antidiscrimination laws in the
workplace, “[h]ostility to antidiscrimination laws creates real hurdles
182
to their enforcement.”
In the context of affirmative action programs, for example, efforts
seen as providing racial minorities with “special rights” have triggered
backlash from the racial majority. Over one-quarter of Americans
(28%) believe that too much attention has been paid to problems
177

178

179

180

181

182

See, e.g., Daud v. Gold’n Plump Poultry, Inc., No. 06-4013, 2007 WL 1621386, at *9 (D.
Minn., May 11, 2007) (evaluating Somali Muslims’ complaints of racial and religious discrimination and determining that they stated only allegations of religious discrimination).
See generally Jeffrey R. Dudas, In the Name of Equal Rights: “Special” Rights and the Politics of
Resentment in Post-Civil Rights America, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 723 (2005) (asserting that the
perception that certain minorities have received “special rights” treatment has triggered
resentment and motivated opposition).
See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, Getting In, NEW YORKER, Oct. 10, 2005 (describing strategies
employed by American colleges in the early twentieth century to keep Jews out); The Jewish Law Student and New York Jobs: Discriminatory Effects in Law Firm Hiring Practice, 73 YALE
L.J. 625, 635 (1964) (describing law firm interview techniques perceived to be intended
to exclude Jews).
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 552 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(explaining that affirmative action programs may be necessary to remedy past discrimination).
Clark Freshman, Prevention Perspectives on “Different” Kinds of Discrimination: From Attacking
Different “Isms” to Promoting Acceptance in Critical Race Theory, Law and Economics, and Empirical Research, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2293, 2318 (2003).
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L. REV. 89, 140
(2008).
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183

facing African-Americans; a sentiment which threatens to exacerbate tangible racial divisions in America. In fact, Professor Clark
Freshman has suggested that the perception that certain minority
groups are receiving “special treatment” may result in “explicit re184
trenchment” of race stereotypes.
On a macrolevel, this may result
in “initiatives . . . to prohibit race-conscious programs in schools and
universities, court decisions invalidating affirmative action, or legisla185
tion.”
Backlash may also occur “on a microlevel when outsiders
cannot break into organizations or through glass ceilings, or when
186
fellow employees sabotage their work.”
Professor Freshman’s analysis of majority backlash against the
“special treatment” of racial minorities suggests that courts’ unique
treatment of Jews could result in increased cultural divisions. Ironically, providing Jews with unique legal treatment has the potential to
increase anti-Semitism and impede the enforcement of civil rights
law.
B. Preserving Religious Preference
Providing Jews with the blanket anti-discrimination protections
given to minority racial groups also undermines private actors’ right
to religious preference. The Free Exercise Clause and the right to
Freedom of Association ensure that a Catholic school may admit
187
Catholic applicants ahead of others. Preferring Catholic applicants
over Jews, however, might not be protected. Instead, because case
law defines Jews as a race, admitting Catholic applicants while denying equally qualified Jews would constitute impermissible racial discrimination. This is true even if a Catholic school’s admissions policy
is based on purely religious preference, e.g., the school holds mandatory activities on Friday evenings or Saturday mornings and believes
that admitting Sabbath-observing Jews would inhibit these activities.
If Jews are treated as a race, the Catholic school no longer has the
constitutional right to reject Jewish applicants.

183

184
185
186
187

The Tea Party Movement:
What They Think, CBS NEWS (April 14, 2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20002529-503544.html?tag=contentMain;
contentBody.
Freshman, supra note 181, at 2318.
Id.
Id. at 2318–19.
See Office of Gen. Counsel, supra note 28 (characterizing a private religious educational
institution’s right to admit members of certain faiths above others as “part of the First
Amendment free exercise right of the religious educational institution”).
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Similarly, a Jewish school could not discriminate against Jewish
applicants. An admissions policy like the one at issue in JFS would be
struck down as unconstitutional. Under American law, as in Britain,
if a Jewish-American student were rejected by a Jewish school because
of his mother’s ancestry, he or she could state a § 1981 claim for ra188
cial discrimination. A number of Jewish schools, however, continue
189
to ask questions related to the ancestry of the applicant. For example, the Ida Crown Jewish Academy in Chicago, Illinois, asks applicants whether their mother and maternal grandmother are “Jewish by
190
birth.” If the applicant, applicant’s mother, or applicant’s maternal
grandmother is “not Jewish by birth,” applicants must “provide [a]
191
A Jewish school such as Ida
certificate of Halachic conversion.”
Crown might try to distinguish itself from a Catholic school that has
rejected Jewish applicants on account of their Jewishness by arguing
that it is merely “policing its own,” a case of Jews discriminating
against other Jews. However, because racial discrimination between
members of the same race is also actionable under § 1981, discrimination against one sect of Judaism by another would still be racial
192
discrimination.
A more difficult question is whether a Jewish school could permissibly reject an applicant on account of his religious practice. This
could occur, for example, if an Orthodox school rejected a “Jewish by
birth” applicant because he was not sufficiently observant. On the
one hand, this kind of religious discrimination between Jews may
constitute a constitutional exercise of a Jewish school’s religious freedoms, analogous to a Catholic school’s ability to preference a Catholic applicant over a Protestant applicant. On the other hand, however, if courts, following LeBlanc-Sternberg and Singer, refuse to analyze
the nature of the school’s admissions decision, a Jewish applicant who
is rejected by a Jewish school because of his religious practice should
188
189

190
191
192

Presuming that the student could show that he had been rejected because of his Jewish ancestry.
See, e.g., Application for Admission, MAIMONIDES SCHOOL, http://www.maimonides.org/
pdf/admissions/Application_GrK-1.pdf (“If your child, either parent, or any grandparent
has been converted, please indicate the name of the Rabbi and Beit Din who performed
the conversion. Please enclose a copy of the certificate of conversion.”); Ramaz Lower
School
Application,
RAMAZ
LOWER
SCH.,
http://www.ramaz.org/public/
LowerSchoolApplication.pdf (asking both applicant’s mother and father to check a box
entitled “Jewish by Birth” or “Jewish by Conversion”).
Application for Admission, IDA CROWN JEWISH ACAD., http://www.icja.org/filebin/
ICJAApplication0809.pdf.
Id.
Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 2008) (“There can . . . be ‘racial’ discrimination within the same race . . . .”).

Nov. 2010]

DISCRIMINATION IN SCHOOL ADMISSIONS

259

be able to state a § 1981 claim for racial discrimination. Thus, the
constitutionality of a Jewish school’s ability to prefer applicants on account of their level of religious observance—the extent to which LeBlanc-Sternberg and Singer may be applied to religious discrimination between Jews—remains an open question.
C. Justifying Greater Judicial Inquiry
Closer judicial examination of anti-Semitic discrimination would
maintain clearer boundaries between claims of purely religious discrimination and those of racial discrimination. In the Singer case, for
example, instead of dismissing the defendants’ claims that their discrimination was religion-based, the court could have examined the
record more closely. Defendants made discriminating remarks about
Singer’s religious clothing, dietary restrictions, and religious prac193
tice. Yet their comments were not based on Singer’s ancestry or any
other unchangeable characteristic; Singer was ethnically Hispanic.
Thus, Singer should not have been allowed to claim race-based discrimination. He should have brought a Title VII claim for religionbased discrimination in employment.
1. Response to Concerns of Judicial Economy
While there are valid concerns that a greater inquiry into whether
anti-Semitism is religious or racial would tax judicial resources and
cause congestion in the courts, this concern should not be exaggerated. Because only a small number of cases involve a need to distinguish between religious and racial discrimination, these fears are
largely unfounded. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) reported
194
1,211 anti-Semitic incidents in the United States for 2009. In 2008,
195
approximately 2% of federal civil cases went to trial. Assuming arguendo that victims of all of these incidents brought civil discrimination suits—as opposed to criminal actions—then judges would be
called upon to adjudicate about twenty-four cases where the line between religious and racial discrimination could be an issue. Moreover, it seems likely that some of those twenty-four cases would be determined on procedural questions. With less than twenty-four of the
193
194
195

Singer v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1, 959 F. Supp. 1325, 1327–28 (1997).
ADL Audit: 1,211 Anti-Semitic Incidents across the Country in 2009, ANTI-DEFAMATION
LEAGUE (July 27, 2010), http://www.adl.org/PresRele/ASUS_12/5814_12.htm.
UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS app. D, tbl. C-4 (2009),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2009/tables/C04Mar09.pdf.
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260,000 case filings that federal trial courts receive annually possibly
requiring some in-depth analysis of discrimination, concerns about
judicial economy remain unwarranted.
2. Response to Concerns of Judicial Expertise
Opponents of a greater examination of anti-Semitism may also argue that judges are not well-equipped to engage in such analyses of
197
There are at least two responses: first, judges are
discrimination.
often called upon to explore areas where they have “little or no ex198
pertise.” Indeed, “[j]udges are hired to be thoughtful legal analysts
and diligent factual analysts,” and should not “shy away from analyz199
ing subjects they do not know in advance” of trial. Second, courts
currently allow a greater number of overly protective judgments. In
deeming all anti-Semitic discrimination “racial,” courts mistakenly
200
conclude that all anti-Semitism is in fact racial.
There may be occasions when the inquiry into the nature of antiSemitism does not yield a clear answer. This could occur, for example, where an individual faced both religious and racial discrimination on account of her Judaism. In those cases, it may be appropriate
for a court to defer to race-based protections for fear of condoning
racial animus. By drawing clear boundaries between religious and racial anti-Semitism, however, courts can preserve well-established differences in law between religious discrimination and racial discrimination and ensure more uniform application of antidiscrimination
laws to all victims. In addition, deeper probing into discrimination
would preserve religious organizations’ First Amendment rights. A
Catholic school’s religious preference would be examined to determine whether the admissions decision was motivated by religious be196
197

198

199
200

Id. at app. D, tbl. C.
See, e.g., Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench: A Definition and a Defense, 11 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 185, 197–98 (2007) (explaining that some scholars object to the idea of
courts engaging with substantive analysis); Hon. Diane S. Sykes, Reflections on the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 737–38 (2006) (criticizing the Wisconsin Supreme
Court for failing to “defer to the judgment of those elected to represent the people”).
But see Christina Bateup, The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of
Constitutional Dialogue, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1109, 1116 (2006) (“Other [scholars] suggest
that a more substantive approach to interpretation is required so that judges can address
the fundamental moral values that are embodied in the Constitution.”).
Courtney T. Nguyen, Note, Employment Discrimination and the Evidentiary Standard for Establishing Pretext: Weinstock v. Columbia University, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1305, 1342–43
(2002).
Scott A. Moss, Reluctant Judicial Factfinding: When Minimalism and Judicial Modesty Go Too
Far, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 549, 566 (2009).
See supra Part V.A.
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lief or racial characteristics. If the Catholic school’s admissions policy
gave preference to non-Jews because admitting Sabbath-observing
Jews would inhibit mandatory Saturday activities, this would be discrimination based purely on Jewish religious practice. As a result, the
admissions policy would be a valid constitutional expression of the
school’s religious belief. In contrast, if the Catholic school’s discriminatory admissions policy were based on an explicit belief that admitting Jewish applicants would change the religious makeup of the
student body, this kind of discrimination would be analyzed as impermissible race-based discrimination.
Similarly, if a Jewish school gave admissions preferences to applicants whose mothers were “Jewish by birth,” this practice would be
struck down as an illegal racial classification. If, however, the Jewish
school evaluated applicants based on their level of observance—for
example, their involvement in synagogue and their commemoration
of Jewish holidays—that might be a permissible religious distinction.
As these examples illustrate, investigating the nature of antiSemitism could be particularly important in religious school admissions where the constitutionality of an admissions decision might depend upon the nature of the discrimination. Although beyond the
scope of this paper, other private institutions expressing religious
201
202
preferences such as nursing homes and private cemeteries could
be similarly affected by the courts’ unique treatment of anti-Semitism.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts and legislatures have long distinguished between racial
and religious discrimination. While racial classifications are almost
always disfavored, religious classifications may be permissible. In
public education, both racial and religious discrimination are prohibited. In private education, racial discrimination remains prohibited
but religious discrimination is permitted. Consequently, in the private school context, courts struggle with cases involving discrimination against groups embodying both racial and religious characteristics.
201

202

The Federal Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in senior housing on the basis of
race. Fair Housing Act § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006). However, the Act allows religious
organizations to prefer applicants for housing on the basis of religion. 42 U.S.C. §
3607(a). For additional discussion, see generally Michael P. Seng, The Fair Housing Act
and Religious Freedom, 11 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 1 (2005).
See Note, The Cemetery Lot: Rights and Restrictions, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 393 (1961) (noting that religious discrimination in cemeteries is arguably protected by the First Amendment.)

262

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:1

The British JFS case exemplifies courts’ difficulties when confronted with discrimination against ethnoreligious groups: if Judaism
is a religion, a private religious school may validly prefer certain Jewish sects above others; if Jews are a race, however, admitting members
of one sect of Judaism over others constitutes impermissible racial
discrimination. Not wanting to inquire into the nature of discrimination against Jews, U.S. courts have rejected even the prospect of separating racial and religious discrimination. Instead, they provide Jews
with race-based protections as a matter of course.
These unique protections for Jews do not seem to be intentionally
preferential. Instead, courts are unsure how to deal with ethnoreligious groups. By providing Jewish litigants with heightened racial
protections, however, courts may unintentionally encourage backlash
against these minorities. Moreover, by providing Jews with unique
legal status, courts may prevent private schools from exercising otherwise constitutionally protected religious preferences.
The tension between the government’s interest in preventing discrimination and its interest in preserving religious freedom is ongoing. Although Jews pose a unique challenge to this balancing
scheme, to the extent possible courts should attempt to delineate between religious and racial discrimination. By differentiating between
discrimination on the basis of ancestry and discrimination on the basis of religious belief and practice, courts may better prevent invidious racial discrimination while at the same time preserving the
freedom of religious preference.

